dr. Raimundas Lopata,
Deputy Director,
Institute of International Relations
and Political Sciences,
Vilnius University

Speech delivered at the solemn sitting of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania in commemoration of 16th February, the Day of the Statehood of Lithuania

Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

When I was invited to take part in this solemn sitting of the Seimas and to present the panorama of historic processes where the 16th February was born, I recalled the complaints that the interwar Lithuanian historians made more than once on similar kind of occasions organised in the then Seimas. "Once again, I have not heard anything new about the 16th February".

Certainly, this complaint can be interpreted in a variety of ways. On the one hand, the commemoration of such dates is probably that rare occasion when history is not blamed for it repeats itself. Yet there is more to it. At such a moment you can be reproached for not having mentioned something which is well known to everybody, yet turns to be insatiably important, what is not new, but sacred.

On the other hand, when the science of history has no will to renounce the role of the teacher, the commemorations are necessary to have a possibility to avoid banal talks and splutter of important facts which are known only to the professionals. What is happening here and now can predetermine the choice of which historic phenomena will be raised to the surface of the ritual speeches.

With regard to Lithuanians' political aspirations during the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, and to be more precise, regarding historic problematics of the restoration of Lithuania, some fundamental questions are worth our attention. They include what our parents wanted to re-establish, or for the sake of accuracy, whether our state in 1918 was re-established or established as a completely new ethno-political entity based on the principle of self-determination of nations which had nothing to do with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (LGD) annexed at the end of the 18th century. Who predetermined the victory on the nation's road to independence? Was that internal determination and will or external international circumstances? Was that a victory at all? We have in mind the implications which are inspired by the phrase of Antanas Smetona who having found himself in emigration said that "the re-establishment of the Lithuanian State on narrow national basis was a mistake".

Yet in the beginning of this century, Povilas Višinskis declared to his brothers and sisters Lithuanians that "our ideal is free, non-suppressed Lithuania, who has got rid of foreign and national despots, and has trodden under her foot the darkness and who is concerned with the improvement of her economic status and makes steps forward together with other free nations" and probably hopeed that there were neither lords nor friends among Lithuanians. Although sensitive and metaphoric, Višinskis was very precise in his formulations of the very idea of independence and intuitively fixed a democratic nature of the future state.

It is understandable that the country can only become independent after she has got rid of foreign powers. The most difficult task was to give the answer on what was "one's own". The problem was that not only at the second half of the 19th century, but also in the beginning of the 20th century Lithuania, it was not very clear what should be understood by saying "Lithuanian" in contrast to what was meant by saying "Estonian" or "Latvian", for example. There was no need to wait for a long time until it became clear that these philosophical difficulties caused serious political complications related to what Lithuania was. Indeed, in that particular case it was not the specific problem of the Lithuanians. The Polish movement also underwent similar difficulties. Precise geopolitical categories made to talk at least about three Polands: that of Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary. In addition, the Two Nation Republic and the Lithuanian Grand Duchy which was annexed to Russia had no any status, whereas the statehood of the Duchy which lasted several centuries was denied. The official Tsarist administration explained that the partition in fact finished the historic process of unification of Russian lands and she did not gain but regained her territories which once had been seized by the Polish Crown. Consequently, when the contours of historic Lithuania reappeared during the revolts of the 19th century including that of 1863, this matter was reflected as the "Polish issue" and as the Polish upheaval against Russia. The local nobility fought for the Grand Duchy of Lithuania although they were related with Poland by the union tights and in the majority of cases were Polonaised ethno-culturally, and though politically they considered themselves as the Lithuanians, they were identified as the Polish nobility.

Namely, the identification grounded on the social-stratification principle allowed Russian administration to call each representative of the Lithuanian nobility a Pole and the people or peasantry the Lithuanians after 1861 reform and particularly after the uprising of 1863. In this way they hoped to solve strategic tasks: first of all, to establish the Lithuanian speaking social base of loyal officials of the Empire by unconciliatingly opposing the national character and etnographicality to political and civil aspirations of the nobility, and secondly, to establish the public opinion that in case the nobility of LGD, the subject of the former state and protector of the statehood tradition, did not belong to the Lithuanians, there were no inheritors to the statehood's legacy. Lithuanians were just a tribe of Lithuanians and Samogitians, nationality, people who underwent discrimination of the Polish colonisers.

It should be recognised that although the methods proposed did not always coincided with those which were practised, they were fruitful. The destructive influence on the Lithuanian society was evident. The modern Lithuanian nation was formed on the ethnographic basis. The Lithuanian national ideology that was developed was grounded on natural ethnic values. This ideology together with geopolitical factors entered into the conflict with traditional culture of the Union represented by the nobility. The collision soon turned into confrontation, since the Polish expansionist endeavours were hidden behind the Lithuanian nation which evolved towards the same direction. Therefore, the decisive argument took place not between the "Lithuanian" and "Union" Lithuania, but in fact between Lithuania and Poland. Certainly, the Tsarist administration should have enjoyed such a situation. Although 1905 in particular demonstrated that the loyalty of the Lithuanians could be reasonably doubted, the Lithuanian popular movement was recognised as an independent ethno-political power which did not alienate itself with the Polish liberation movement. Meanwhile, in the eyes of the Russians, the Lithuanian issue was related to the so-called national problems whose solution mechanism was based on the so-called national principle. Since the status of the principles in the set of legal norms seemed to be rather complicated, their application was left to the good will of the prominent monarch.

It is likely that in this context there is a necessity to separate the problem of Lithuania's statehood from the general issue of the establishment of an independent state. The first problem was the liberation from Russia and restoration of the former state; the second problem was the choice of a modern Lithuanian state with respect to the Union with Poland. Namely in these tensions the vision of the aspired Lithuanian state was formed. The refusal of the Union legacy ensured that Russia and eventually Germany would decrease their pressure on Lithuania who as a geopolitical balance to Poland was reborn on the Lithuanian ethnic lands, basically in four the then Vilnius, Kaunas, Grodno and Suvalki provinces or on actual lands of Lithuania with the capital Vilnius after elimination and or at least subordination of the Polish culture. Mentioned here should be people other than Lithuanians and representing ethical cultures who lived in actual Lithuania and who often identified themselves with the name of Lithuania by calling themselves Litvins, Litvaks or just the citizens of Lithuania. In this case we can view Lithuania in the plans of Lithuanians as some kind of modern restitution of the old structure of the LGD.

Certainly, all this is just a common line of political trends in Lithuania, whose development, making concrete and embodiment depended on rapidly changing international circumstances, particularly during World War I. At the beginning of the War conservative leaders of Lithuania (nationalists and Christian democrats according to their party affiliation) considered Poland and traditions related to Poland as the main obstacle for Lithuanian political perspective. The Lithuanian rightists would look for support in Russia and in the well-known panslavistic doctrine. Of course, according to the theory, Germanic states should be divided or geographically moved to the West, and new Slavic states or those which were influenced by the Slavs would replace them. Thus, the role of Russia should increase and the role of Germany in the Baltics and former lands of LGD would decrease respectively. The Lithuanian rightists thought that the prospect of geopolitical rearrangements would not only help them to overcome the Polish dominance in Vilnius region and German dominance in the Lithuanian Diaspora residing in the Lower Nemunas, but also set preconditions for Lithuania's political autonomy with Vilnius and Klaipėda. These plans received their reflection in the well known "Amber Declaration" which at the beginning of the War was handed over to the central administration of Russia by Lithuanian conservative leaders thereby expressing their loyalty. It should be noted that the Lithuanian leftists, often populists and sometimes social democrats (according to their party affiliations) were more lenient towards the disagreements with Poland and more sceptical towards the loyalty to Russia. The aforementioned Lithuanian politicians did not give up the ideas to revive Lithuanian - Polish relations which could have become the precondition for the establishment of an independent geopolitical factor in Eastern Europe. However, being weaker, the Lithuanian left finally got caught the rightists political will.

The situation changed in 1915 when Germany made efforts to take over the initiative from Russia to participate in the contest for "national affiliation" by spreading her occupation over western territories of the Romanov Empire. Lithuanian affiliation to a great extent depended on promises to assist in combating Polish dominance in Vilnius region. These promises namely predetermined that the Lithuanian State Council of 1917 overestimated Germany's potentials as those of international guarantee. Germany, similarly to Russia could only perform the function of the objectively stabilising power at the best case, and not that of absolute legal guarantee. Practically, Germany's assistance to the Lithuanian national movement was motivated only by provoking the conflict between Lithuania and Poland, and not by implementing Lithuania's aspiration.

Of course, it would not be right to forget certain attempt of Lithuanian activists to neutralise the consequences of German assistance. It is fairly evident that with the growing urgency of the issue of international recognition in the course of time, the appeals to the nation and self-determination were broadened by appeals to the state traditions in the statements by the Lithuanians. The explanation can be quite simple. Having acquainted with the principles of Western world, it became clear that much cherished slogan of self-determination of nations to a great extent raised by the initiative of W. Wilson could practically be applied only to the nations which used to have their statehood, and that in any case an appeal only to the ethnographic particularities was not enough for the recognition in the West. Nevertheless, such efforts naturally witnessed the affiliation of Lithuanian political aspirations with the orientation to the West. Unfortunately, it is not clear whether Lithuanian political thought equally understood another aspect in understanding self-determination of nations, namely civil rights guarantees.

On the one hand, the Lithuanian State Council silently, yet clearly supported social conservatism, i.e. legal support and mansions as if they were a contribution to the Poles for their acceptance of Lithuanian ethnic culture and prove of talks about strong executive power in the Lithuanian political system, i.e. constitutional monarchy. All this together with the state restoration imperatives would witness the consideration of internal, civil - national consolidation.

In the other hand, the state territory was decreased to a "healthy core" where ethnographic Lithuanians would constitute the majority even in case when those who had assimilated would be considered as lost for good. In such a space Lithuanians could rest upon the majority principle, i.e. to establish the state irrespective to the opinions of non-Lithuanians. That was likely to be right, since that principle was recognised by democracy. However, it was based not on the active majority rights of the society (or contract) but on the precondition of a bigger ethnic community. Therefore, it is not strange that it meant the subordination of the state to the interests of one nation, i.e. turning the state into certain home of that nation and granting other nations the status of a lodger.

Unfortunately, external effects were more favourable for the latter tendency, i.e. force rather than agreement. Practically, after the victory in the internal fights for separation, it seemed right that the right to self-determination of nations was enforced on probation as the right to "self-determine". It also seemed right, because such a victory had to prove capability for the statehood life, and the maturity for the performance did not require rights at all.

Pitifully, there were no many rights and good will in Central and Eastern Europe in the beginning of the 20th century. Therefore, the destiny of the newly emerging states was accompanied by tragic trials. The problem of the nation and the state has remained until nowadays. That means that there are responsibilities retained to solve them. Since it is not possible to strictly formalise the responsibility of such a level, I would like to remind you such an allegory which is in my opinion was aptly pointed out by one of colleagues of mine. He said that "it is clear that a baby is born naturally and irrespective to anything. He is born even than when his mother does not want him or even when she dies, and the baby is not to blame for that. However, when he grows up and learns the price of coming into the world, there is hope that he will have much better understanding of the value of Christian truths".