5 February 2010
Members of the Seimas, Your Excellencies,
Political analysts and experts,
Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,
We have convened to the conference bearing a title that, upon first encounter, must have raised some doubts and might have even elicited scepticism. Could it be true that twenty years after the reestablishment of independence we still have misgivings about our key political guidelines? Both our internal and foreign policy seemed to be guided by the national strategy objectives, including the re-establishment of national independence, putting the country on track to progress and prosperity, and joining international alliances that would provide the guarantee of national security and create preconditions for economic wellbeing.
However, the political framework in our country, region, and the world at large is in a state of permanent flux and marked by dynamic change and constant renewal. This is why the provisions, guidelines, and objectives seemingly set in stone for the long haul can undergo serious changes in view of the present developments. Therefore, it is of key importance to keep raising the questions akin to the one we have convened to debate. Our efforts should converge with the real and not imaginary political reality. In the light of these goals I invite the political analysts and decision-makers exchange their views on the current Lithuanian foreign policy, major issues, and eventual development prospects.
It is high time we did this, as our foreign policy used to suffer from a lack of inter-institutional dialogue on vision and implementation for far too long. The decisions and actions in the area of Eastern policy were particularly conducive to the debate frequently tinted with emotion. What I mean are the attempts and opportunities for establishing new relations with Russia as well as the approach to the current political regime in Belarus.
It is likely that the debate that has engulfed our political scientists, diplomats, and politicians was fuelled by the change in the global international climate, and, more specifically, by the initiative of the US to reset its relations with Russia.
In some quarters there is an inclination to think that this turn in the US policy means that Lithuania has to adapt to the change in the geopolitical situation and start reaching out to Russia and setting pragmatic objectives for bilateral relations.
The opposing argument is that the change does not amount to a fundamental shift of paradigm but rather represents a tactical step in the US foreign policy forged to entice Russia into the pro-American geopolitical field without providing Moscow with any real political benefits. Hence, Lithuania need not fall prey to the so-called Realpolitik. Quite the reverse, we should continue the implementation of the value-oriented Eastern policy.
These are the challenges that inform the foreign policy debate in Lithuania, questioning the existence of our truly own vision of Eastern policy. It is my wish that the distinguished guests of the Conference – political scientists, analysts, and experts – examine the benefits and drawbacks of Lithuania’s Eastern policy with a sceptical and critical eye, succinctly formulate the problems, and embark on a search for answers to the multitude of questions.
One of the misgivings often voiced in the public realm is the worry that the US-initiated policy to reset the relations with Russia and the eventual geopolitical exchange between the global powers means that our NATO and EU membership might be a pure formality. The question is: does Lithuania’s NATO and EU membership genuinely serve to guarantee national security and stability?
These doubts could obviously be alleviated by relevant measures on the part of the Alliance, including the formulation of the defence planning, exercise, and infrastructure development policy, putting the practical instruments for collective defence in place, and increasing the visibility of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Provided Lithuania feels it is more integral part of the Alliance, it will be less sensitive about the various initiatives for US- Russia and NATO – Russia dialogue.
The key question to be answered in the framework of the discussion is this: can the EU-Russia relations be governed by mutually binding legal principles? Do we have the potential to produce a tangible change in Russia’s status quo, where an active involvement in the EU’s internal processes does not translate into meeting Russia’s legal obligations? If the EU fails to use its leverage in the field, Lithuania should put the task forward to the European institutions in unequivocal terms. What if it occurs that wielding influence in the area is impossible? Could we possibly consider going with the flow and acting along the Russian rules? The question is ironical and hopefully rhetorical. Still, it has a direct bearing on the conceptual problem: have we learned to use the EU instruments for reaching our foreign policy objectives?
The European and Lithuanian policy on Belarus is also a point of contention. On the one hand, much hailed is the two-speed strategy of engagement with both the democratic opposition and the current political power in Belarus. The engagement is aimed at opening the country up for EU rules and standards. On the other hand, we are continuously confronted with the question of who are the winners in this battle of wills and why. Can we set any clear-cut rules to control the agenda in the area of bilateral relations with Belarus?
As we have seen, the questions are wide and cover both strategy and tactics. Obviously, our analytical capacities in the foreign policy realm need strengthening. It is therefore imperative to ensure close cooperation and links between the decision-makers and policy implementation authorities on the one hand and research and think tanks on the other.
Today’s conference offers a welcome opportunity for cooperation. I feel that we are in for an open discussion and brilliant ideas. It is my hope that events like this one will become a tradition.
