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An Comhchoiste um Thalmhaíocht, Bia agus Muir

**An Cion Polaitiúil maidir le hAthchóiriú an Chomhbheartais Talmhaíochta ó
2020 ar aghaidh**

Aibreán 2017

Joint Committee on Agriculture, Food and the Marine

**Political Contribution on Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy
Post-2020**

April 2017

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Part I

Report of the Oireachtas Joint Committee

Introduction

1. The Oireachtas Joint Committee on Agriculture, Food and the Marine, hereinafter referred to as “the Committee”, considered reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) at a number of meetings: 17 January 2017, 21 February 2017, 7 March 2017, and 4 April 2017.
2. The Committee, on the basis of its considerations, contributed to the Joint Parliamentary Declaration of the Commission Des Affaires Européennes of the French Sénat, culminating in a meeting of parliamentary committees from France, Ireland, Italy, and Poland on 11 April 2017 at which a final text was agreed.¹
3. The Committee sought written submissions on the topic of reform of the Common Agricultural Policy.
4. The Committee has set out a number of points for consideration by the Commission in Part 2 of this document in addition to the points raised in the Joint Parliamentary Declaration agreed in Paris on 11 April 2017.

Decision of the Joint Committee

Having noted the ongoing *Consultation on modernising and simplifying the common agricultural policy (CAP)*, the Committee agreed to submit a Political Contribution to the EU institutions on Reform of the CAP Post-2020, outlining key components of CAP reform. The Committee seeks to contribute constructively to the Commission’s efforts to reform the CAP.

The Political Contribution, in Part 2 of this Report, was agreed by the Committee on 4 April 2017 and is hereby formally communicated to the European Commission, the European Council, the European Parliament, and the respective relevant Irish Government Minister, the Minister for Agriculture, Food and the Marine. The report will also be laid before the Houses of the Oireachtas.

¹ Commission Des Affaires Européennes, *Joint Parliamentary Declaration On The Future Of The Cap For 2020: “Rebuilding The Common Agricultural Policy, A Strategic Priority For The Future Of The European Union”* (11 April 2017)
<http://www.senat.fr/fileadmin/Fichiers/Images/commission/affaires_europeennes/Divers/Declaration_PAC_ENG_.pdf> accessed 18 April 2017

Submissions and Presentations

The submissions made to aid the Committee in its consideration of Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy are available [online](#).² A number of organisations were invited to make written submissions. The table below identifies stakeholders whose written submissions were received by the Committee.

Table 1 Written submissions received

Written submissions received (Ireland)
Faculty of Agriculture and Food Science, University College Dublin
Irish Creameries Milk Suppliers Association (ICSMA)
Irish Dairy Industries Association (IDIA)
Irish Farmers Association (IFA)
Macra na Feirme (Macra) ³

The Committee also relied upon a written statement⁴ and subsequent engagement with Professor Alan Matthews which took place on 17 January 2017.⁵ The Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine also provided written briefing material to the Committee.

² Submissions and presentations

<http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/oireachtasbusiness/committees_list/agriculturefoodandthemarine/presentations/>

³ Macra na Feirme, *Common Agricultural Policy 2020: Young Farmer Roadmap for Generational Renewal* (March 2017) <<http://www.macra.ie/system/assets/303/original/macra-na-feirme-cap-2020-young-farmer-roadmap-for-generational-renewal.pdf?1490878138>> accessed 15 March 2017

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Joint Committee on Agriculture, Food and the Marine (17 January 2017)

<<http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates%20authoring/DebatesWebPack.nsf/committeetakes/AGJ2017011700001?opendocument>>

Part II

Introduction

This Political Contribution sets out the Committee's perspective of the requirements of a reformed CAP post-2020. The Committee acknowledges the challenging environment within which a new CAP must be developed; the Committee also notes that a new CAP must be designed to meet these challenges. The Committee's CAP reform priorities reflect a continued need to address the policy objectives of the 2013 reform: viable food production, sustainable management of natural resources and climate action, and balanced territorial development.⁶

Simplification remains a significant challenge for the CAP. Simplification will benefit everyone, from national administrations to farmers; however, it will be difficult to achieve where the CAP undergoes significant change. It is likely that the process of simplification of recent years will need to be continued to provide these benefits in the longer term. The Committee notes that the Pillar structure may require examination as part of a reformed CAP. As is commented on elsewhere the distinction between the pillars has already become blurred.⁷ Further reform of the CAP could further erode any practical reasons for differentiating between the pillars.

European agricultural policy must recognise the value of small family run farms producing efficiently and in an environmentally friendly manner. It is argued that the societal, animal welfare, food quality, and environmental benefits of this approach over that of intensive factory production are self-evident. Agricultural policy should not pursue ever cheaper food; rather, the true value of food production must be accepted and communicated to the public.

The context within which a new CAP is to be developed is particularly challenging. As always, volatility is an ever-present threat to the agricultural sector, as is *force majeure*. *Force majeure* events are likely to become more frequent and more serious as climate change continues and extreme weather events impact on producers throughout the EU.

European agriculture faces other significant challenges, not least the UK's impending departure from the EU. While this poses more significant challenges for some Member States than others, the Committee is of the belief that all Member States must recognise the seriousness of the threat to their partners. Solidarity must be shown in the face of challenges; the success of the EU and its policies rely on the concerted efforts of all Member States.

European trade policy may also present difficulties for European agriculture; again, these challenges are likely to impact particular sectors in certain Member States more than others. To some extent,

⁶ European Commission, *Overview of CAP Reform 2014-2020* (2013)

<http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/policy-perspectives/policy-briefs/05_en.pdf> accessed 31 March 2017

⁷ David Baldock, Allan Buckwell, Erik Mathijs & Alan Matthews, *CAP: Thinking Out of the Box: Further modernisation of the CAP – why, what and how?* (2017)

<http://www.risefoundation.eu/images/files/2017/2017_RISE_CAP_Full_Report.pdf> accessed 29 March 2017 pp.15-16

these impacts are the necessary cost of European trade policy; however CAP may play a role in mitigating these impacts.

A further issue is presented by the challenge of adequately resourcing the CAP in the coming years. This is likely to be a significant challenge, but the Committee strongly suggests that the CAP budget should be maintained at its present level, rather than at its present proportion of the overall budget.

The Committee again notes the Joint Parliamentary Declaration agreed in Paris on 11 April 2017 which sets out eight Principles of Action in reform of the CAP.⁸ This contribution seeks to detail additional issues which the Committee proposes are essential in consideration of a reformed CAP.

⁸ Commission Des Affaires Européennes, *Joint Parliamentary Declaration On The Future Of The Cap For 2020: "Rebuilding The Common Agricultural Policy, A Strategic Priority For The Future Of The European Union"* (11 April 2017)
<http://www.senat.fr/fileadmin/Fichiers/Images/commission/affaires_europeennes/Divers/Declaration_PAC_ENG_.pdf> accessed 18 April 2017

CAP Reform Priorities

Supporting Producers: Making Farming Pay

- **Market supports**
- **Making farming an attractive and viable occupation for new entrants**

Protecting the Environment: Maintaining the Countryside

- **Agricultural emissions (GHG)**

Supporting Rural Communities: Sustainable Rural Communities

- **Offsetting urban drift**

Resourcing the CAP

- **Ensuring adequate funding to support European agriculture and rural communities.**

Supporting Producers: Making Farming Pay

In order for the CAP to achieve any measure of success it should facilitate making farming a viable occupation. Increased focus needs to be placed on strengthening the position of producers so that the CAP is not utilised as a support mechanism but rather as a tool to produce efficiencies and improve environmental outcomes. In order to have maximum effect, the CAP must strive to ensure payments are directed to those who are considered active farmers. The Committee notes that progress has been made in this regard, and urges that such measures be continued in future.

The CAP post 2020 must set as a target an overall improvement in farm income levels, through direct support, targeted measures for investment and efficiency, and through strengthening farmers' positions in the food supply chain.⁹

Member States and the European Commission presently support farmers to a significant extent. Their willingness to intervene and provide direct support to producers when the market fails to do so has, to some extent, subsidised production. Until such time as this changes, producers are unlikely to receive adequate compensation from the market itself. The solutions to this issue are not obvious; however, the Agricultural Markets Task Force Report *Improving Market Outcomes: Enhancing the Position of Farmers in the Supply Chain*¹⁰ makes a number of useful recommendations in this regard.

Rural Income

Disposable income tends to be lower in rural Ireland.¹¹ The table in Appendix 3 illustrates a clear geographical dimension to farm income. Farming income average is lowest (below €15,000) in five counties located in the West and North-West. Conversely the six counties with the highest farming income average (in excess of €30,000) are located in the South, South-East, and East of the country. This corresponds to the map in Appendix 4 with the lowest farm incomes being found in areas subject to the *Disadvantaged Areas Scheme*.¹²

The disparity of persons at risk of poverty (AROP) or social exclusion by degree of urbanisation is comparatively minor in Ireland. Interestingly, Ireland is one of only two Member States in which towns and suburbs demonstrate a greater prevalence of persons AROP or social exclusion.¹³

⁹ The Irish Farmers' Association, *Review of the CAP Post-2020* (April 2017)

<http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/oireachtasbusiness/committees_list/agriculturefoodandthemarine/presentations/>

¹⁰ Agricultural Markets Task Force, *Improving Market Outcomes: Enhancing the Position of Farmers in the Supply Chain* (2016) <https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/agri-markets-task-force/improving-markets-outcomes_en.pdf> accessed 23 March 2017

¹¹ <http://cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/cirgdp/countyincomesandregionalgdp2014/>

¹² Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine, *Single Payments Scheme/ Disadvantaged Areas Scheme* <<https://www.agriculture.gov.ie/farmerschemespayments/archivedschemes/singlepaymentschemedisadvantagedareascheme/categoriesofdisadvantagedareas/>> accessed 21 April 2017

¹³ Eurostat, *People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by degree of urbanisation, by country* (2014) (2016) <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/4/41/People_at_risk_of_poverty_or_social_exclusion_by_degree_of_urbanisation%2C_by_country%2C_2014.JPG> accessed 30 March 2017

[T]here is a lack of public awareness of the rural poverty problem and of the need to address it. Reasons may be the lack of adequate data and analysis, which makes the European rural poor almost invisible in official documents, the fact that they are less organised than in urban areas, so that their voice is much weaker than that of other groups at risk of poverty, and the existence of stereotypes on rural areas, such as the assumption that family and community support is stronger in rural areas than in cities.¹⁴

Opportunities

The CAP has undergone significant reform already; however, a number of weaknesses in the current CAP have been identified and present opportunities for meaningful reform. First:

[T]he high dependence of EU agriculture on public support can be seen as representing a failure of policy to equip farmers to successfully operate in a more competitive environment. From this perspective, the money used to provide untargeted public support would be more effectively used to support farmers through more targeted measures, for example, to improve their competitiveness through research, extension, better infrastructure, promoting innovation, supporting quality production, encouraging producer groups and exploring new income-earning opportunities in the bioeconomy.¹⁵

Secondly:

[P]articularly damaging for a social measure is that the DPs [Direct Payments] are not equally distributed among beneficiaries in the European Union. In 2014, on average, 80% of the beneficiaries received only 20% of the payments [...]. More embarrassingly still, for a social welfare measure is that payments are highly concentrated on farms with higher incomes. Around 750,000 farms in the top 10% of income group receive over half of the direct payments budget in the CAP. Just 5% of direct payments go to farms with incomes below the median farm.¹⁶

It is necessary to reform CAP to strengthen the position of producers rather than acting retrospectively to address market failures after the fact. The challenge is substantial but there exists an opportunity to reform European agriculture in such a way as to balance a number of competing needs. It will require the CAP to display greater long term vision for the development of agriculture, primarily by enhancing the ability of producers to receive fair remuneration both for their output and for farming in an environmentally conscientious manner.

¹⁴ European Parliament, *Rural poverty in the European Union* (March 2017)
<[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI\(2017\)599333](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2017)599333)> accessed 30 March 2017 pp.3-4

¹⁵ Alan Matthews, *The Future of Direct Payments* (2016)
<[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/585898/IPOL_STU\(2016\)585898_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/585898/IPOL_STU(2016)585898_EN.pdf)> accessed 30 March 2017 p.40

¹⁶ David Baldock, Allan Buckwell, Erik Mathijs & Alan Matthews, *CAP: Thinking Out of the Box: Further modernisation of the CAP – why, what and how?* (2017)
<http://www.risefoundation.eu/images/files/2017/2017_RISE_CAP_Full_Report.pdf> accessed 29 March 2017 p.13

Generational Renewal

Appendix 7 illustrates that across the EU there is only a small portion of farmers (of family farms) aged less than 35. Ireland is by no means exceptional in having in excess of 50% of such farmers aged 55 or more. This illustrates that there is a widespread issue in attracting new entrants to the sector. This is a result of two primary factors:

- I. The income prospects from farming are not sufficiently attractive; and/or
- II. Other barriers to new entrants such as affordability of agricultural land.

While certain measures have been put in place to facilitate younger entrants to farming (such as knowledge transfer and supports for young farmers) the CAP itself may, in some cases, be having the opposite to desired effect:

Direct payments have discouraged some farmers from exiting agriculture and slowed the reallocation of land towards more efficient farms.¹⁷

It is essential that farm income be addressed in order to generate interest in agriculture as a sector in which careers can be built, which would be of more general benefit to rural communities. It may be possible to look at incentivising not just young farmers, but specifically young female farmers. Figure 1 below illustrates the gender gap on EU farms. Recent years have seen programmes promoting opportunities in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) for women; it may be the case that the potential of female agricultural producers is an untapped resource.

Figure 1 The gender gap on EU farms¹⁸

	Male	Female
Working on the farm on a regular basis	58%	42%
Working as a farm holder	70%	30%
Working as a family member	42%	58%
Farm manager with full agricultural training	83%	17%
Average farm size in hectares (ha)	20 ha	8 ha
Average livestock units per farm (LU)	26 LU	8 LU

Conclusion

A reformed CAP is essential if farming is to be transformed into a viable and attractive profession. There are many ways which cumulatively can facilitate this transition. Additionally, some of these measures could serve to provide additional value for money (VFM), particularly where societal and environmental benefits accrue. Areas to be explored in enhancing farm income include:

- I. Strengthening the position of producers within the supply chain;

¹⁷ Alan Matthews, *The Future of Direct Payments* (2016)

<[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/585898/IPOL_STU\(2016\)585898_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/585898/IPOL_STU(2016)585898_EN.pdf)>
accessed 30 March 2017 p.33

¹⁸ European Parliament, *Women and their roles in rural areas* (2017)

<[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/599374/EPRS_ATA\(2017\)599374_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/599374/EPRS_ATA(2017)599374_EN.pdf)>
accessed 29 March 2017

- II. Introducing environmental measures which encourage, and reward, producers for following environmental best practice in the sector;
- III. Encouraging training for producers encouraged as:

The Indecon Report found a positive relationship between investment in capital and stock and increased output. It also found that a trained farmer has 12% higher levels of output compared with an untrained farmer.¹⁹

- IV. Promoting organic production as producers can create premium products with reduced inputs as fertiliser and pesticides are not spread on the crops.²⁰

In the long-term a reformed CAP should increase the resilience of producers to shocks either from *force majeure* or market failures. In the short-to-medium term there remains a requirement for the CAP to shield producers from the greatest threats to their income. Recognising that this risks diverting significant portions of the budget from the attainment of longer-term goals, the Committee recommends that reform of the Agricultural Crisis Reserve Fund be examined. The Committee suggests that the following be considered:

- I. That the Agricultural Crisis Reserve Fund, levied from payments to farmers, be expanded to form a co-operative, not-for-profit, insurance scheme;
- II. That the fund should be reviewed to ensure it is accessible and conditions are appropriate and transparent;
- III. In order to ensure adequate funding it may be necessary to retain the levied payments on a rolling basis to ensure that, in the event of a large-scale crisis, the fund has sufficient revenue to meet claims made;
- IV. Once a sufficient fund had been established, funds in excess of that amount could be refunded to producers. This would mean that, in the long-term, it may only be necessary to levy smaller amounts from direct-payments to top up the fund to a minimum threshold; and
- V. Farmers could opt to have larger deductions from their direct payments in order to receive higher levels of cover.

The Committee expresses its reservations about any reform of the CAP which would force producers to seek insurance from private enterprises, for the following reasons:

- I. Insurance schemes place an onus on the farmer to seek coverage for a wide range of potential damage. Producers may be unable to avail of affordable insurance coverage due to the volatility frequently experienced in the sector;
- II. Producers may find it difficult to secure appropriate insurance cover, and, in some cases could pay for insurance policies which do not adequately protect them.

¹⁹ Agri-taxation Working Group, *Report of the Agri-taxation Working Group to the Minister for Finance and the Minister for Agriculture, Food and the Marine* (October 2014)

<http://www.budget.gov.ie/Budgets/2015/Documents/Agritaxation_%20Review%20Final_web-pub.pdf>

accessed 29 March 2017

²⁰ Joint Committee on Agriculture, Food and the Marine (28 March 2017)

<http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates%20authoring/DebatesWebPack.nsf/committeetakes/AGJ2017032800002?opendocument#E00900>

- III.** The sector is heavily reliant on direct payments. Until the sector is developed to a point where such direct support is no longer a necessity, additional financial burdens must be avoided whenever possible.
- IV.** In some smaller Member States insurance markets may suffer from a lack of competition, which is likely to result in higher premiums.

Protecting the Environment: Maintaining the Countryside

It is essential that Member States react appropriately to climate change by adopting measures to reduce its negative impact upon the environment. It is not suggested that less should be done in this regard; rather, the way in which we seek to achieve these goals should be amended. If the EU is to provide food security and meet the needs of its citizens, land must be used in the most efficient manner possible to maximise production. This does not mean that agricultural emissions cannot be reduced; rather, land should be farmed to the greatest economic benefit using the most environmentally friendly methods. For example, the Beef and Dairy carbon navigators demonstrate that greenhouse gas emissions may be reduced through more efficient practices.²¹

The current CAP has not adequately addressed the issue of environmental protection. In 2015 “only 26.9% of the physical area of [Ecological Focus Areas] was devoted to the most beneficial elements for the environment”²² and:

The three greening practices were primarily targeted at different environmental objectives – crop diversification at soil health, EFAs [Ecological Focus Areas] at biodiversity and permanent grassland at carbon storage. [...] The crop diversification and permanent grassland measures have led to no immediate changes at farm level. In the case of the crop diversification requirement ... Most farmers were following these practices in any event as part of good farm husbandry.²³

Sustainable intensification must take account of the other impacts of the farming activities pursued, in the case of livestock farming impacts on groundwater and native flora and fauna must also be considered and factored into farming strategies. This is essential given that Irish policy is to increase output; with projected knock-on effects on emissions.²⁴

Emissions are a problem beyond the issue of climate change, impacting on the health and welfare of citizens, as well as having an additional impact on the economy. For 2013 the European Environment Agency estimated that:

²¹ Teagasc, *The Beef Carbon Navigator: Improving carbon efficiency on Irish beef farms* <<https://www.teagasc.ie/media/website/about/our-organisation/Bord-Bia-Beef-Carbon-Navigator-LR4.pdf>> accessed 19 April 2017; and

Teagasc, *The Dairy Carbon Navigator: Improving Carbon Efficiency on Irish Dairy Farms* <<https://www.teagasc.ie/media/website/about/our-organisation/Bord-Bia-Dairy-Carbon-Navigator-LR5.pdf>> accessed 19 April 2017

²² Alan Matthews, *The Future of Direct Payments* (2016) <[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/585898/IPOL_STU\(2016\)585898_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/585898/IPOL_STU(2016)585898_EN.pdf)> accessed 30 March 2017 p.42

²³ Ibid p.41


²⁴ Environmental Protection Agency, *Ireland's Greenhouse Gas Emission Projections: 2016-2035* (April 2017) <http://www.epa.ie/pubs/reports/air/airemissions/ghgprojections/EPA_2017_GHG_Emission_Projections_Summary_Report.pdf> accessed 13 April 2017 p.4

[I]n the region of 1,600 premature deaths were attributable to fine particulate matter and other air pollutants in Ireland. In addition, estimates indicate that air pollution has health-related costs in Ireland of over €2 billion per year, including the loss of 382,000 workdays per year.²⁵

Pollution also has broader economic impacts:

[D]irect economic damage from air pollution in EU in 2010 was estimated at €23 billion, including €15 billion from lost workdays, €4 billion from healthcare costs, €3 billion from crop yield loss and €1 billion from damage to buildings, while total external costs of the health impacts ranged from €330 billion to €940 billion, i.e. amounting for 3-9 per cent of EU GDP.²⁶

Figure 2 Projected sectoral share of total greenhouse gas emissions (includes ETS and non ETS emissions) in 2020 in the With Additional Measures Scenario²⁷



²⁵ European Commission, *Conclusions on the Clean Air Dialogue with Ireland* (March 2017)

<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/pdf/conclusions_CleanAirDialogue_Ireland.pdf> accessed 31 March 2017

²⁶ Samvel Varvaštian, 'Achieving the EU Air Policy Objectives in Due Time: A Reality or a Hoax?' [2015] 24(1) European Energy and Environmental Law Review

<<http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/document.php?id=EELR2015001>> accessed 21 April 2017 p.3

²⁷ Environmental Protection Agency, *Ireland's Greenhouse Gas Emission Projections: 2016-2035* (April 2017) <http://www.epa.ie/pubs/reports/air/airemissions/ghgprojections/EPA_2017_GHG_Emission_Projections_Summary_Report.pdf> accessed 13 April 2017 p.6

Proposed Solutions

I. An Holistic Approach to Emissions

Firstly, it is suggested that all significant types of farming should be analysed across Member States, and further afield if necessary. Such a process should identify the optimal way in which these types of farming can be conducted with minimal environmental impact. On the basis of this benchmarking process, Member States should receive specific sectoral and sub-sectoral emissions targets.²⁸ There must be a holistic analysis of EU agricultural emissions. Reducing production in one Member State will likely drive increases in production in others; this is unlikely to be of environmental benefit. It is also essential to note CO₂ emissions on a per capita basis as per Appendix 5.

Rather than targeting emissions reductions by a given percentage, this approach would encourage Member States to pursue the most-environmentally method of farming without abandoning the most-productive use of the available land mass.²⁹ Payments could be made contingent upon achieving and even exceeding these standards. For example, in marginal (low-quality land) there may be no viable alternative other than livestock farming (potentially high in emissions). The proposed approach would facilitate the best economic usage of the land while still promoting environmentally friendly farming if implemented in conjunction with measures to increase forestry, biodiversity, and improvement of soil health. It is argued that targeting emissions reductions as a percentage will not necessarily reflect the most efficient approach to farming on an EU-wide basis.

Emissions per kg of cow milk are estimated at 1.4 kg of CO₂-eq on EU average [...]. The lowest cow milk emissions are created in Austria and Ireland (1 kg), the highest in Cyprus (2.8 kg) and Latvia (2.7 kg).³⁰

Given that Ireland exports such a large proportion of overall dairy production, and as dairy production here is seemingly one of the most efficient systems in the EU, there seems little sense in reducing dairy production, necessitating increases of less efficient production elsewhere.³¹ That is not to say that Irish agriculture is without room to improve, indeed a recent report suggests that Ireland has the least efficient agricultural production system in the EU on the basis of value of agricultural output per tonne of carbon dioxide (equivalent)

²⁸ These targets should be sector specific and not vary from one state to another. Some flexibility should be afforded where, for a reason beyond the control of the Member State, simply cannot meet the benchmark.

²⁹ European Commission, *COM(2014) 15 Final COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS: A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030* (2014) <<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0015&from=EN>> accessed 29 March 2017

³⁰ Katarzyna Biala, David Grandgirard, Thomas Fellmann, Adrian Leip, Philippe Loudjani, Suvi Monni, Ignacio Perez, Francesco Tubiello, Tom Wassenaar, & Franz Weiss, *Evaluation of the livestock sector's contribution to the EU greenhouse gas emissions (GGELS): final report* (2010) European Commission, Joint Research Centre. <http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/external-studies/2010/livestock-gas/full_text_en.pdf> p.29

³¹ Bord Bia, *Dairy* <<http://www.bordbiavantage.ie/market-information/sector-overviews/dairy/>> accessed 20 April 2017

emissions.³² These diverging analyses of Irish agriculture suggest that there is little financial reward for environmentally efficient means of production at this time.

II. Targeted Environmental Measures

A reformed CAP must connect payments to activities generating genuine environmental benefits. This will necessitate some flexibility to reflect the structure of the agricultural sectors in the Member States, including *inter alia* respect for limitations in some arising from their climate, agricultural land quality and availability, and the scale of farm holdings.

Pillar 1 payments must be linked to demonstrable improvement in the environment sustainability of agricultural production.³³

The CAP should thereby facilitate achieving Europe's food security objectives while also balancing competing demands in order to promote:

[T]he best means of encouraging the sustainable intensification of food production, while optimising the sector's contribution to greenhouse gas mitigation and sequestration, including through afforestation.³⁴

III. Carbon Sequestration

Carbon sequestration offers opportunities to store carbon dioxide in solid or liquid form. Using these methods there are opportunities for Member States to substantially reduce their volumes of CO₂ emissions.

If Ireland is committed to reducing its agri-environmental footprint, there needs to be greater flexibility around the composition of greening. Evidence suggests that the C-sequestration potential of pastures merits much greater attention, and needs to become a policy priority with respect to ruminant-based livestock production. This could potentially be an excellent mechanism to encourage more sustainable grassland management practices, which could have the potential to benefit GHG emissions, biodiversity, water quality etc. and would be particularly relevant within an Irish context.³⁵

³² European Parliament, *Policy support for productivity vs. sustainability in EU agriculture: Towards viable farming and green growth* (January 2017)

<[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_STU\(2017\)585905](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_STU(2017)585905)> accessed 20 April 2017 Figure 5 p.25

³³ UCD School of Agriculture and Food Science, *Submission on Review of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Post-2020* (2017)

<http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/oireachtasbusiness/committees_list/agriculturefoodandthemarine/presentations/> p.2

³⁴ European Council, *2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework* (October 2014)

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/145397.pdf> accessed 29 March 2017 p.5

³⁵ UCD School of Agriculture and Food Science, *Submission on Review of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Post-2020* (2017)

<http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/oireachtasbusiness/committees_list/agriculturefoodandthemarine/presentations/> p.3

Additionally, other forms of carbon sequestration may merit further investigation, even if more suitable to industrial application. Use of these methods may significantly offset the per capita output of CO₂ of Member States.

[T]his technology especially (geological sequestration) encourages the injection of large volumes of carbon dioxide into the subsurface effectively isolating it from the atmosphere for long (geologic) periods, either in deep brine-bearing formations or depleted oil and gas reservoirs. Studies have shown that as much as 1,000 years' worth of CO₂ emissions could be safely sequestered in these geological formations and is likely to remain stable over long periods (hundreds of thousands of years or more).³⁶

In effect, such methods of sequestration have similar effects to that of outright CO₂ reduction due to the potential to store CO₂ over such long periods. There are other methods whereby carbon dioxide can be sequestered³⁷ and/or processed to form less harmful, and indeed, useful products.³⁸ The Commission must explore the opportunities which carbon sequestration presents. It is possible that Member States who have fully exploited gas or oil reserves may have the capability to safely sequester large volumes of CO₂. The potential of these states to sequester CO₂ output of other Member States would not only be of benefit to the environment but could also generate economic activity.

IV. Promotion of organic production

The Committee met with representatives of the organic farming sector and were informed of the potential benefits of organic production.³⁹ Denmark was highlighted as illustrating the use of organic farming to address environmental issues.⁴⁰ Contributors highlighted that organic farming promotes biodiversity, is not reliant on inputs such as fertilisers and pesticides (which are frequently imported), and potentially results in lower agricultural fuel usage due to the lack of those inputs. The premium price obtainable for organic produce was also cited as an additional reason for producers to consider this method of production;

³⁶ Mary Sabina Peters, 'Minimize Risk of Carbon Sequestration through Environmental Impact Assessment and Strategic Environmental Assessment' [2015] 24(1) European Energy and Environmental Law Review <<http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/document.php?id=EELR2015002>> accessed 21 April 2017 p.13

³⁷ Damian Carrington, 'CO₂ turned into stone in Iceland in climate change breakthrough: Radical new technique promises a cheaper and more secure method of burying CO₂ emissions underground instead of storing it as a gas' *The Guardian* (London, June 2016) <<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jun/09/co2-turned-into-stone-in-iceland-in-climate-change-breakthrough>> accessed 20 April 2017

³⁸ Roger Harrabin, 'Indian firm makes carbon capture breakthrough: Carbonclean is turning planet-heating emissions into profit by converting CO₂ into baking soda – and could lock up 60,000 tonnes of CO₂ a year' *The Guardian* (London, January 2017) <<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jan/03/indian-firm-carbon-capture-breakthrough-carbonclean>> accessed 20 April 2017

³⁹ Joint Committee on Agriculture, Food and the Marine (28 March 2017) <http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/Debates%20Authoring/DebatesWebPack.nsf/committeetakes/AGJ2017032800002?opendocument#E00900>

⁴⁰ Danish Agriculture & Food Council, *All About Organics: Danish food that matters* (2015) <<http://www.agricultureandfood.dk/mwg-internal/de5fs23hu73ds/progress?id=Ai2H4DWkyAaS1tvh5zNlckKnrXnkAwKf8C-Ya2X9lC8>> accessed 20 April 2017

an example was provided which indicated that organic oats for milling obtained a price of €350 per tonne, rather than a price of between €1-200 for non-organic oats.⁴¹

⁴¹ Patrick Lalor, Joint Committee on Agriculture, Food and the Marine (28 March 2017)
<http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/Debates%20Authoring/DebatesWebPack.nsf/committeetakes/AGJ2017032800002?opendocument#E00900>

Supporting Rural Communities: Sustainable Rural Communities

The CAP must ensure innovative supports for rural communities. The CAP must be more than a subsidy for rural living and must approach the challenges facing rural communities. It is recognised that each Member State must take a lead role in enhancing the viability of country life, but, the CAP offers an opportunity to coordinate and incentivise this activity across the entire EU.

Rural communities are changing, and the reality is that farming now forms one of many potential employment opportunities in rural Ireland. In order to offset urban drift, Pillar II of the CAP has the potential to address the need to diversify employment opportunities in rural areas, and counteract long-distance commuting.⁴²

World Bank data shows that declining rural populations are a near-global trend. In many cases declining rural populations (at least as a percentage of overall populations) indicate falling viability of this lifestyle. It is essential that this problem be addressed before irreparable damage is done. The issue goes beyond declining rural populations; there is also a question as to the relative position of rural communities to their urban counterparts. In Ireland, persons at risk of poverty or social exclusion are not significantly affected by degree of urbanisation; however, this is not true throughout Europe and obscures other disadvantages associated with rural life.⁴³ Such disadvantages must be addressed by:

[S]ocial services of various kinds (advice, additional training, 'lifelong learning', supported employment opportunities, childcare provision etc.).⁴⁴

As educational attainment increases, young people are given the opportunity to seek more remunerative employment. Frequently such employment is concentrated in urban areas, drawing young people away from rural areas.

The capacity of many rural areas to create sustainable jobs has fallen behind that of urban areas. Generally, incomes are lower and there are fewer job opportunities, within a narrower range of activities.⁴⁵

It is noted that addressing these disadvantages is a challenge which must be met primarily by Member States themselves.

⁴² UCD School of Agriculture and Food Science, *Submission on Review of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Post-2020* (2017)

<http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/oireachtasbusiness/committees_list/agriculturefoodandthemarine/presentations/> p.5

⁴³ Eurostat, *People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by degree of urbanisation* (March 2017)

<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/ilc_peps13> accessed 20 April 2017

⁴⁴ ESPON, *The Territorial Dimension of Poverty and Social Exclusion In Europe* (2012)


<https://www.espon.eu/export/sites/default/Documents/Projects/AppliedResearch/TIPSE/TIPSE_Inception_Report.pdf> accessed 30 March 2017 p.17

⁴⁵ European Parliament, *Rural poverty in the European Union* (March 2017)

<[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI\(2017\)599333](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2017)599333)> accessed 30 March 2017 p.7

These are difficult and expensive to deliver to scattered individuals in sparsely populated areas. Rationalisation and privatisation of public services have often increased the subjective disadvantage (marginalisation) of these individuals/groups.⁴⁶

Figure 3 Increasing Urban Populations – Pros & Cons



Long-term challenges facing rural communities:

- I. If infrastructure, investment and employment are made available to generate rural renewal, there remains a risk that rural areas may be reliant on a single, or small number, of employers. While this is not ideal, it is suggested that this would be an improvement over the *status quo*.
- II. Retention of highly educated individuals will be difficult as creation of sufficient skilled jobs is challenging in rural areas where critical mass to support certain sectors and/or industries may never exist.
- III. There is likely to be inertia in investing in rural areas particularly in the private sector. The Committee notes the example of Shannon, a new town built in the 1960s which illustrates that such investment offers longer-term returns.⁴⁷

The Irish Case

Appendix 6 illustrates that Ireland's rural population is proportionately larger than the EU average despite having witnessed a steady decline in rural population; this is simply part of an EU wide trend with rare exception. Recent decades have seen Ireland's rural population as a % of overall

⁴⁶ ESPON, *The Territorial Dimension of Poverty and Social Exclusion In Europe* (2012)

<https://www.espon.eu/export/sites/default/Documents/Projects/AppliedResearch/TIPSE/TIPSE_Inception_Report.pdf> accessed 30 March 2017 p.17

⁴⁷ Matt Kennard & Claire Provost, 'Story of cities #25: Shannon – a tiny Irish town inspires China's economic boom' *The Guardian* (London, 19 April 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/apr/19/story-of-cities-25-shannon-ireland-china-economic-boom?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other> accessed 21 April 2017

population fall substantially (-17% in the period 1960 to 2015).⁴⁸ This fall is not atypical, indeed it is reasonably close to the average EU reduction over the same period (-14%).⁴⁹

Increasing urban populations, either in absolute or proportionate terms, are not inherently negative, although they present challenges in urban and rural contexts as summarised in Figure 3. As an example of the challenges of increasing urban populations, property prices in Dublin have shown rapid growth in recent years including strong post-recession recovery.⁵⁰

While increasing property prices are indicative of economic growth, combined with limited supply housing will become increasingly unaffordable either to rent or purchase for certain portions of society. The issue of low urban supply versus high urban demand suggest that with the right policies, it may be possible to encourage growth outside of cities. Such an approach would normalise property prices in urban areas while also benefitting rural communities.

Creating Viable Rural Communities

If the increasing concentration of populations in cities can be seen as an indication of falling viability of rural life, it is necessary to take action to slow, and ideally, reverse this trend. It will take significant time and resources to achieve this objective; however, a reformed CAP can help orchestrate and encourage steps towards attaining this goal.

Member States will be required to supplement a revised CAP with their own initiatives to raise the viability of country-life. Key in reversing the diminishing rural population is the provision of infrastructure. While the EU can aid Member States in achieving this, the primary responsibility rests with the Member States themselves.

It is suggested that due to the scale of the problem the issue cannot be resolved with a programme which is not specifically targeted. It may be necessary to develop a programme which targets rural communities where there is existing potential to be exploited (i.e. infrastructure exists or can be easily made available). A focussed approach such as this could demonstrate that rural communities can be made viable, and if successful could encourage the broader rollout of the programme. An approach by Member States which is coordinated with the CAP to attain maximum efficacy could incentivise service provision and job creation in disadvantaged rural areas. A programme to this end within the CAP would represent a proof-of-concept which Member States could then choose to implement more broadly when possible.

⁴⁸ <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS?locations=IE>

⁴⁹ <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS>


⁵⁰ 'House prices up almost 11pc as rate of rise in properties outside Dublin soaring' *The Irish Independent* (Dublin, 19 April 2017) <<http://www.independent.ie/business/personal-finance/property-mortgages/house-prices-up-almost-11pc-as-rate-of-rise-in-properties-outside-dublin-soaring-35635481.html>> accessed 19 April 2017

Resourcing the CAP

This contribution sets out how reform of the CAP targeting specific issues will have knock-on effects. There is no panacea to the ills of the agricultural sector; however, a reformed CAP can have mutually reinforcing programmes which will strengthen the agricultural sector and aid Member States in reversing decades of rural decline.

In order for the CAP to achieve its objectives it must be resourced appropriately. It is accepted that Brexit will significantly impact the budget of the EU.⁵¹ The CAP budget and specifically the CAP budget are at risk of reduction in the coming years. The efficacy of the CAP is inextricably linked to the resources made available to it; however, it is accepted that there may be a need to examine how the CAP functions in order to use resources more efficiently.

Figure 4 Revitalising Rural Europe



Maintenance of the current CAP budget may require justification by linking its objectives with broader European priorities such as job creation, growth and investment, food security and climate change. This may require a rebalancing of the pillars of the CAP or more fundamental reform.⁵² In the Irish case over the period 2015-2020 direct payments to Union support for rural development

⁵¹ Jörg Haas & Eulalia Rubio, 'BREXIT AND THE EU BUDGET: THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY?' (2017) Jacques Delors Institute Policy Paper No. 183 <<http://www.institutdelors.eu/media/brexitbudget-haasrubio-jdi-jan17.pdf?pdf=ok>> accessed 21 April 2017

⁵² Alan Matthews, *The Future of Direct Payments* (2016) <[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/585898/IPOL_STU\(2016\)585898_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/585898/IPOL_STU(2016)585898_EN.pdf)> accessed 30 March 2017 p.11

are in the ratio of 3.88:1.⁵³ This ratio will likely change substantially in the event of significant reform of the pillar structure of the CAP.

The Committee notes that maintaining the current budget for the EU following Brexit will be challenging, with three potential scenarios arising:

- I. Cuts to other areas of the EU budget;
- II. Increased contributions from Member States; and
- III. A combination of the above.

The reality is that all of these approaches are likely to be unpopular in numerous Member States. One analysis suggests that each of the EU27 would need to increase its per capita contributions to the EU budget by between €4 and €55.⁵⁴

Today, there is a middle group of countries that is relatively close to balance in per capita terms, including France, Ireland, Italy, and Spain[...]. They could either support a budget reform or a rise in contributions, and their position could be decisive in shaping the next MFF. Brexit could tip the scales in favour of reform. Spain could join the net contributors, and countries like Ireland and Italy could become firmly established in the group. Smaller countries like Cyprus and Croatia would come closer to net balance. Compared to the old “Likeminded Group”, the result would be a broader and, in the absence of the UK, softer coalition in favour of reforms or cuts.⁵⁵

There is also sustained pressure to rebalance the distribution of payments between Member States. Accepting that this is likely to continue, it is imperative that a reformed CAP must aim to make best use of funds available. This is of greater significance for Member States that are net contributors to the EU’s budget. Efficiency at farm level will have to be matched by effective and efficient schemes under the CAP.

⁵³ European Commission, *Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 and the financing of the CAP* (2013) <https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/cap-funding/budget/mff-2014-2020/mff-figures-and-cap_en.pdf> accessed 21 April 2017

⁵⁴ Jörg Haas & Eulalia Rubio, ‘BREXIT AND THE EU BUDGET: THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY?’ (2017) Jacques Delors Institute Policy Paper No. 183 <<http://www.institutdelors.eu/media/brexitbudget-haasrubio-jdi-jan17.pdf?pdf=ok>> accessed 21 April 2017 p.14

⁵⁵ Ibid

Appendices

Appendix 1: Terms of Reference

a. Functions of the Committee – derived from Standing Orders [DSO 84A; SSO 70A]

- (1) The Select Committee shall consider and report to the Dáil on—
 - (a) such aspects of the expenditure, administration and policy of a Government Department or Departments and associated public bodies as the Committee may select, and
 - (b) European Union matters within the remit of the relevant Department or Departments.
- (2) The Select Committee appointed pursuant to this Standing Order may be joined with a Select Committee appointed by Seanad Éireann for the purposes of the functions set out in this Standing Order, other than at paragraph (3), and to report thereon to both Houses of the Oireachtas.
- (3) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (1), the Select Committee appointed pursuant to this Standing Order shall consider, in respect of the relevant Department or Departments, such—
 - (a) Bills,
 - (b) proposals contained in any motion, including any motion within the meaning of Standing Order 187,
 - (c) Estimates for Public Services, and
 - (d) other matters

as shall be referred to the Select Committee by the Dáil, and

 - (e) Annual Output Statements including performance, efficiency and effectiveness in the use of public monies, and
 - (f) such Value for Money and Policy Reviews as the Select Committee may select.
- (4) The Joint Committee may consider the following matters in respect of the relevant Department or Departments and associated public bodies:
 - (a) matters of policy and governance for which the Minister is officially responsible,
 - (b) public affairs administered by the Department,
 - (c) policy issues arising from Value for Money and Policy Reviews conducted or commissioned by the Department,
 - (d) Government policy and governance in respect of bodies under the aegis of the Department,
 - (e) policy and governance issues concerning bodies which are partly or wholly funded by the State or which are established or appointed by a member of the Government or the Oireachtas,
 - (f) the general scheme or draft heads of any Bill,
 - (g) any post-enactment report laid before either House or both Houses by a member of the Government or Minister of State on any Bill enacted by the Houses of the Oireachtas,

- (h) statutory instruments, including those laid or laid in draft before either House or both Houses and those made under the European Communities Acts 1972 to 2009,
 - (i) strategy statements laid before either or both Houses of the Oireachtas pursuant to the Public Service Management Act 1997,
 - (j) annual reports or annual reports and accounts, required by law, and laid before either or both Houses of the Oireachtas, of the Department or bodies referred to in subparagraphs (d) and (e) and the overall performance and operational results, statements of strategy and corporate plans of such bodies, and
 - (k) such other matters as may be referred to it by the Dáil from time to time.
- (5) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (1), the Joint Committee appointed pursuant to this Standing Order shall consider, in respect of the relevant Department or Departments—
- (a) EU draft legislative acts standing referred to the Select Committee under Standing Order 114, including the compliance of such acts with the principle of subsidiarity,
 - (b) other proposals for EU legislation and related policy issues, including programmes and guidelines prepared by the European Commission as a basis of possible legislative action,
 - (c) non-legislative documents published by any EU institution in relation to EU policy matters, and
 - (d) matters listed for consideration on the agenda for meetings of the relevant EU Council of Ministers and the outcome of such meetings.
- (6) Where a Select Committee appointed pursuant to this Standing Order has been joined with a Select Committee appointed by Seanad Éireann, the Chairman of the Dáil Select Committee shall also be the Chairman of the Joint Committee.
- (7) The following may attend meetings of the Select or Joint Committee appointed pursuant to this Standing Order, for the purposes of the functions set out in paragraph (5) and may take part in proceedings without having a right to vote or to move motions and amendments:
- (a) Members of the European Parliament elected from constituencies in Ireland, including Northern Ireland,
 - (b) Members of the Irish delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and
 - (c) at the invitation of the Committee, other Members of the European Parliament.
- (8) A Select Committee appointed pursuant to this Standing Order may, in respect of any Ombudsman charged with oversight of public services within the policy remit of the relevant Department or Departments, consider—
- (a) such motions relating to the appointment of an Ombudsman as may be referred to the Committee, and
 - (b) such Ombudsman reports laid before either or both Houses of the Oireachtas as the Committee may select.

b. Scope and Context of Activities of Committees (as derived from Standing Orders) [DSO 84; SSO 70]

- (1) The Joint Committee may only consider such matters, engage in such activities, exercise such powers and discharge such functions as are specifically authorised under its orders of reference and under Standing Orders; and
- (2) Such matters, activities, powers and functions shall be relevant to, and shall arise only in the context of, the preparation of a report to the Dáil and/or Seanad.
- (3) The Joint Committee shall not consider any matter which is being considered, or of which notice has been given of a proposal to consider, by the Committee of Public Accounts pursuant to Standing Order 186 and/or the Comptroller and Auditor General (Amendment) Act 1993; and
- (4) any matter which is being considered, or of which notice has been given of a proposal to consider, by the Joint Committee on Public Petitions in the exercise of its functions under Standing Orders [DSO 111A and SSO 104A].
- (5) The Joint Committee shall refrain from inquiring into in public session or publishing confidential information regarding any matter if so requested, for stated reasons given in writing, by—
 - (a) a member of the Government or a Minister of State, or
 - (b) the principal office-holder of a body under the aegis of a Department or which is partly or wholly funded by the State or established or appointed by a member of the Government or by the Oireachtas:Provided that the Chairman may appeal any such request made to the Ceann Comhairle / Cathaoirleach whose decision shall be final.
- (6) It shall be an instruction to all Select Committees to which Bills are referred that they shall ensure that not more than two Select Committees shall meet to consider a Bill on any given day, unless the Dáil, after due notice given by the Chairman of the Select Committee, waives this instruction on motion made by the Taoiseach pursuant to Dáil Standing Order 28. The Chairmen of Select Committees shall have responsibility for compliance with this instruction.

Appendix 2: Committee Membership

Chairperson: Pat Deering (FG)

Vice Chairperson: Jackie Cahill (FF)

Deputies: Michael D’Arcy (FG)
Martin Kenny (SF)
Charlie McConalogue (FF)
Willie Penrose (Lab)
Thomas Pringle (I4C)


Senators: Paul Daly (FF)
Tim Lombard (FG)
Pádraig Mac Lochlainn (SF)
Michelle Mulherin (FG)

Appendix 3: Average Income by County (2013)⁵⁶


County	Gross Income Average €	Farming Income Average €
Carlow	42,565	27,468
Cavan	41,353	19,252
Clare	42,762	16,411
Cork	49,290	32,910
Donegal	33,452	12,088
Dublin	60,160	31,302
Galway	41,384	14,397
Kerry	42,196	20,172
Kildare	54,375	31,938
Kilkenny	49,517	34,004
Laois	45,549	26,112
Leitrim	39,984	10,760
Limerick	49,391	27,503
Longford	44,435	17,771
Louth	42,947	26,366
Mayo	38,426	10,875
Meath	50,741	27,875
Monaghan	34,545	22,284
Offaly	44,752	23,888
Roscommon	42,007	12,860
Sligo	41,615	11,976
Tipperary	45,139	32,368
Waterford	47,822	37,154
Westmeath	47,218	21,524
Wexford	43,537	29,984
Wicklow	45,531	26,629

⁵⁶ Revenue, *The Farming Sector in Ireland: A Profile from Revenue Data* (October 2015)
www.revenue.ie/en/about/publications/farming-profile.pdf accessed 27 March 2017 p.8

Appendix 4: Mountain Sheep Grazing and Disadvantaged Areas Scheme Map




Appendix 5: CO₂ Emissions (metric tons per capita)⁵⁷




⁵⁷ <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC?contextual=region&locations=IE>

Appendix 6: Rural Population (% of total population)⁵⁸



⁵⁸ <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS>

Appendix 7: Distribution of managers on farms with only family workers, by age of manager, 2013 (% of total number of managers working in farms with only family workers)⁵⁹



Note: Croatia, not available. The figure is ranked on the share of managers aged 65 years or over.

⁵⁹ Eurostat, *Distribution of managers on farms with only family workers, by age of manager, 2013* (% of total number of managers working in farms with only family workers) (2013) <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Agriculture_statistics_-_family_farming_in_the_EU#Farm_managers_by_age_.E2.80.94_an_analysis_for_the_EU-28> accessed 29 March 017