EPRS

Policy foresight unit (PFOR)

Mission:

To foster a culture of anticipatory governance within the European Parliament

1. Risk and capabilities

- Future Shocks reports
- Strategic autonomy 360° monitor
- Policy-specific publications

2. Strategic Foresight Conversations

• Future of EU-Ukraine relations 2035

3. Futures literacy

- Methodology trainings and support
- Outreach

Capabilities: strategic autonomy

- What the EU can do about its own situation
- Managing dependencies on others
- Terminology: open SA, sovereignty, capacity to act
- Thematic papers: defence, energy, chips, ...

BRIEFING	((Chill)
EU Strategic Autonomy Monitor July 2022	European Parliament
EU strategic autonom	y 2013-2023
From concept to ca	apacity
SUMMARY	
EU strategic autonomy (EU-SA) refers to the capacity of the EU being dependent on other countries – in strategically importe defence policy to the economy, and the capacity to uphold d	ant policy areas. These can range from
In order to structure the debate on strategic autonomy into an that by and large there have been several phases to the debate a from 2013 to 2016, it was mainly seen a san approach to secure 2019, EU-SA was considered as a way to defend European interer marked by Brexit, the Trump Previdency and China's growin pandemic shifted the focus to mitigating economic dependent the scope of EU-SA has been windened to virtual/apile ILD policy. while the expression 'strategic autonomy' was paradoxically use concepts, such as 'open strategic autonomy' and 'strategic sovere trims binding uses 'strategic autonomy' and 'strategic sovere terms. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 202 bing taken, while the concept nevertheless remains biurred	hout EU-SA, each with a different focus; ity and defence matters. From 2017 to its in a hostile geopolitical environment, a assertiveness. In 2020, the Covid-19 areas, including that of the EU's values, d less and was often replaced by similar ignty ' capacity to act' and 'resilience', signty ' as equal and interchangeable 2, steps towards achieving EU-SA are
Achieving EU-SA will require a common vision, political will a distinct role for the EU, between Member States and global strategic autonomy wheil (in Annex 1), can help to identify do interdependencies between policy areas. Political will was Versailles Declaration of 11 March 2022, which aims at greate the economy. However, EU-SA can be constrained by Memb or international organisations that challenge the EU. This EU 20	players. Visual tools, such as the 360° pendencies and understand complex expressed in the European Council's EU-SA in defence, energy supply and er States and non-EU (third) countries

2013-2016 - Autonomy in security and defence

by thematic papers in the 'strategic autonomy 360° series.

The basic assumption behind any debate about EU strategic autonomy is that Europe is an entity capable of taking its own decisions and determining its own future. Since the days of the EU founding fathers in the 1950s, this autonomy has increased as regards geography and competences. Geographically, Europe as an actor of its own has expanded from a Community of six to the current Union of 27 states. Its competences have grown from solely economic matters to virtually all policy areas, although these are shared with the Member States and other international organisations! However, as 1950s efforts to establish a European Defence Community failed, it has taken until the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon to add substantial power in security and definee matters to the EU's competences. Some of the Member States which are also North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members did not perceive much need for a separate EU defence policy (or even saw this as a threat the states which are labored to the state shorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the states of the Member States which are also North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the states of the Member States which are also North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the states of the Nember States which are also North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the states of the Nember States which are also North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the states of the Nember States which are also North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the states of the Nember States which are also North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the states of the Nember States which are also North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the states of the Nember States which are also North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the states of the Nember States which are also North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the states of the Nember States of the Nember States of the Nember State States of the Nember States of the Nember States of the Nember States of the Nember States of the Nem

in a series on the state of play in the debate and implementation of EU-SA. It will be complemented





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EN

EU-Ukraine 2035 foresight conversation

- June 2022 April 2023
- Multi stage stakeholder consultation
- 50 + experts
- Phase 1: 360° exploration
- Phase 2: scenarios
- Phase 3: policy considerations



Fair Stability

- Ukrainian victory Russian regime change
- Comprehensive peace agreement
- Ukraine accedes to EU and NATO
- Economic recovery



Cold War II

- Front stuck Iron curtain, Russian hybrid actions
 - No formal agreements
 - Ukraine accedes to EU, gets security guarantees
 - Slow recovery



LOW

Ukraine-Russia Hazard

EU-Ukraine

MIN

MAX

HIGH

Frozen conflict

- Front stuck exhausted parties negotiate
- Ceasefire agreement with trade offs
- Ukraine doesn't accede to EU nor NATO (neutral)
- Recession/partial recovery



Devastated Europe• Russia escalates• Fragmentation o• Ukraine doesn't

- Russia escalates war => NATO involvement
- Fragmentation of Russia, upheaval in Belarus
- Ukraine doesn't accede to EU, but to NATO
- EU and Ukraine economy damaged



Future Shocks annual report - objectives

<u>**Part 1.</u>** Provide up-to-date, objective and authoritative information about global risks</u>

- introduction to risk, risk aggregation, risk governance
- survey of risk literature
- figures illustrating interconnectedness between risks and capabilities, and estimated probability/impact of risks

Part 2. Analyse 15 specific risks that have the potential to harm Europe and its people.

<u>**Part 3.</u>** Identify 10 policy options for EU decision-makers to effectively address these risks.</u>

Future Shocks 2022

Addressing risks and building capabilities for Europe in a contested world



Future Shocks – risks 2022

- Russia's brutal expansionism
- Extreme weather events
- Very high energy prices
- Another major pandemic
- Is a public debt risk looming post-COVID?
- Stalling economy with possible slumpflation
- Semiconductor supply chain disruption *
- Growing democratic fragility

- Collapse of the internet
- Algorithms undermining rational political debate
- Deepening and pervasive social divisions
- EU spending capacity under threat
- Major slowdown of the Chinese economy
- Acute stress at EU borders

Future Shocks – policy responses 2022

- Climate-proofing the EU
- Building a European social model for the 21st century
- Strengthening our energy security
- Responding better to future pandemics
- Promoting economic recovery and resilience
- Establishing a greater strategic autonomy for European industry

- Consolidating strategic ties with democracies
- Building a healthier online
 environment for healthy democracies
- Safeguarding EU and global food security
- Strengthening European defence
 union
- Consolidating EU internal security